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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the relationship between brain drain, human capital accumulation and individual
net incomes in the presence of a redistributional tax policy, credit market constraints, administrative
costs of tax collection, and lack of government commitment. We characterize how decreasing
migration costs for skilled workers affect the time-consistent policies of a government that wants
to shift resources from skilled to unskilled workers. In our main result we show that a decline in
migration costs is Pareto improving when migration costs are high, but have ambiguous effects when













janeba@colorado.edu”Does it matter if clever people leave in such numbers? For the world as a whole, it makes
sense for the cleverest to exercise their skills where they earn the greatest reward. But what
holds for the world may not hold for individual countries that lose large swathes of their educated
middle class....To the loss of productivity potential, add the ﬁscal losses from migration. Tax-
payers in developing countries have paid to educate many of those who leave... And emigration
leaves behind fewer workers to pay the cost of looking after the old.”
”On the other hand, emigration may bring other beneﬁts to the sending country. The
possibility of leaving and the higher income to be earned abroad may encourage more people to
go into higher education. As not everyone will leave, the result will be a bigger pool of skills
than would otherwise be the case.” The Economist (2002, p. 30)
21 Motivation
The integration of world markets is a continuous process and changing in nature. At the
beginning, international eﬀorts aimed at tearing down the barriers to trade. In recent
years, the focus has shifted from the free movement of goods to that of production fac-
tors. World-wide capital markets have been substantially liberalized, and international
labor migration has been becoming an important issue. The growing integration of la-
bor markets is partly based on institutional changes. The European Union, for instance,
abolished all legal barriers to the movement of individuals in its jurisdiction and cre-
ated a common labor market. Moreover, some previously rather ‘closed’ countries, like
Germany, have opened their borders for skilled workers. Maybe more important, these
political developments are accompanied and supported by technological progress. New
information systems enable an Indian computer expert to search for a job in the United
States from her home town. Since low transportation and communication costs reduce
the expenses necessary to keep in touch with relatives and friends in the country of origin,
the psychological barriers to emigration diminish too. All in all, the costs of international
mobility have signiﬁcantly declined over the last decades.
Nevertheless, there are still substantial hurdles to the movement of labor. Many
countries are rather selective when they set their immigration criteria. Legal entry is
often restricted to skilled workers. The educated are also those who can take advantage
of the new technologies necessary to participate in the international labor market. For
this reason mainly high-skilled workers can use the opportunity to substitute their jobs
at home for better-paid ones abroad.1
The emigration of human capital concerns many opponents of globalization, as the
ﬁrst part of the above quote from the Economist is alluding to. The threat of brain drain
puts pressure on governments to adjust their economic policy to the beneﬁt of skilled
workers, for example, by lowering the eﬀective tax burden for high-income earners. The
ensuing erosion of tax revenues restricts government interventions twofold. First, it limits
redistribution toward those who cannot beneﬁt from the new opportunities. Thus, society
becomes more polarized, and social tensions may rise. Second, it constraints a govern-
1Becker et al. (2003), for instance, provide evidence for the rising mobility of well-educated individuals
within Europe. They show that the graduates’ share of the Italian emigrants quadrupled between 1990 and
1998. Between 3% and 5% of the annual graduates left Italy in this period. Carrington and Detragiache
(1998, 1999) analyze extensive data on brain drain from developing to industrialized countries. For
instance, 26% of the Ghanaians with tertiary education live abroad compared to only 0.7% and 0.1% of
those with secondary and primary education, respectively. An overview of recent migration trends is also
given in OECD (2003) and Wildasin (2000).
3ment’s ability to publicly fund accumulation of human capital. This support might be
necessary to overcome market failures, such as insuﬃcient access to credit markets, which
limits a poor household’s ability to receive higher education without public support.2 All
in all, many opponents of globalization fear that wealth will be increasingly concentrated
in the hands of a declining number of people.
By contrast, proponents of globalization tell a diﬀerent story, as the second part of
the quote from the Economist suggests. International wage diﬀerentials for skilled work-
ers provide strong incentives to invest in skills. To the extent that such diﬀerentials
are driven by taxes, they also lead to desirable policy changes. Edwards and de Rugy
(2002) point out that competition for human capital has intensiﬁed because international
migration of skilled workers is increasingly motivated by tax diﬀerentials. In their view
society beneﬁts from higher mobility for the very reason that it curbs taxes and gov-
ernment spendings. Declining revenues force governments to reduce high administrative
costs associated with the income tax and social security system, which in industrialized
countries such as Canada and Great Britain amount to 7% and 5% of revenue collected,
respectively (Vaillancourt, 1989, Sandford et al., 1989).3
Moreover, globalization softens the well-known hold-up problem caused by a redis-
tributive government. Since governments are unable to commit credibly to a future tax
policy, they implement policies that are optimal at the current point in time rather than
stick to strategies that were optimal in the past. The resulting time-consistent policy
tends to overtax the returns on human capital as an individual’s investment in education
is sunk once her labor income is subject to taxation (see, for instance, Boadway, Marceau
and Marchand, 1996). Anticipating the burdens imposed by future taxation, households
underinvest in human capital. Government intervention is therefore seen as the cause and
not the solution to poverty and increasing polarization.
In the current paper we analyze the above arguments in favor and against globaliza-
2The returns to education investments are substantial - about 12% in Latin America and the Caribbean
and still more than 8% in OECD countries for investments in higher education (see Psacharopoulos, 1994)
- and can be seen as an indicator for underinvestment in human capital. The imperfect access to credit
markets is emphasized in World Bank (1999, p. 52): “If credit markets for human resource investments
are imperfect - as indeed they seem to be almost everywhere - households, particularly poor households,
may not be able to ﬁnance investments in education despite high expected rates of return. Their lack
of access to credit reﬂects information problems. Would-be lenders cannot properly assess the returns to
investing in human capital, nor can such capital be collateralized”.
3The problems and costs of tax collection are even more severe in developing countries. Acharya
(1985), for instance, estimates that only 53.3% of India’s taxable income was actually reported for tax
purposes.
4tion in the form of international migration of skilled workers.4 While some fear that redis-
t r i b u t i v ep o l i c i e sb e c o m ei m p o s s i b l ei nag l o b alized world, others argue that world-wide
liberalization helps to overcome the drawbacks associated with such policies. Since both
sides rest their arguments on redistributive interventions, we focus on a ‘left’ government
who wants to shift resources from skilled to unskilled workers. We study how declining
migration costs of skilled workers aﬀect the policy of such a government, how they shape
the available incomes of skilled and unskilled workers, and how they inﬂuence human cap-
ital accumulation. The fall in migration costs may be the result of technological progress,
as described above, or the result of political changes such as in the European Union. We
also analyze how our conclusion depends on the degree of government eﬃciency, that is,
the size of administrative costs associated with public interventions.
To this end, we capture the following stylized facts relating to the debate - credit con-
straints, administrative costs of tax collection and the government’s lack of commitment
- in a simple multi-stage model with internationally mobile skilled labor. We consider a
small open economy which faces the threat of brain drain. The government controls an
education subsidy, a transfer payment to unskilled worker, and a tax rate on skilled work-
ers. In our main result we show that starting from a closed economy declining migration
costs ﬁrst improve the consumption of both skilled and unskilled workers, then worsen the
consumption opportunities of all households, and ﬁnally beneﬁt mobile skilled workers at
the expense of the unskilled labor force.
This non-monotonic relationship between migration costs and individual welfare re-
ﬂects two opposing forces at work. On the one hand, lower mobility costs reduce taxes on
skilled workers and thus revenues available for redistribution. On the other hand, it also
leads to cuts in administrative costs and in excessive education subsidies, which are neces-
sary to sustain the incentives for private investment in education in anticipation of future
high taxes. When mobility costs are high, the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one, and
more resources are available for redistribution. Unskilled workers gain from globalization
through rising transfers, contrary to the claims of globalization opponents. However, if
migration costs fall below a critical level - and thus are suﬃciently low - the optimistic
result is reversed. Even skilled workers suﬀer from rising mobility because lower taxes on
their income are more than oﬀset by the decline in the education subsidy. This result is
in contrast to what globalization optimists expect. Perhaps worse, the size of the skilled
labor force falls when migration costs decline precisely because the education subsidy falls.
As a consequence of the opposing eﬀects of globalization, ‘moderate’ globalization is
4Other arguments in favor of skilled migration, but not considered here further, are remittances and
possible increases in pay for remaining workers. See the Economist (2002) for further discussion.
5optimal from the perspective of a redistributive government. The precise level of the ‘op-
timal’ migration costs depends on several factors, of which we discuss two in more detail.
The poorer the country, as measured by the international wage diﬀerential for skilled
workers, the less a ‘left’ government is in favor of globalization. More surprisingly, both
countries with very eﬃcient and very ineﬃcient public sectors might embrace openness
more than countries with medium administration costs.
Our paper extends and qualiﬁes two strands of the literature. First, our work re-
lates to recent contributions emphasizing positive eﬀects of enhanced mobility. For in-
stance, Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), Mountford (1997), Stark, Helmenstein and
Prskawetz (1997, 1998) and Vidal (1998) all argue that open borders make private invest-
ments in education more attractive. In their analyses, the gain from the positive incentive
eﬀect can dominate the negative eﬀect from brain drain and, thus, increase human capital
at home. Similar to these articles, we also claim that the opportunity of emigration can
be beneﬁcial for the source country, albeit for very diﬀerent reasons. Unlike our paper,
this literature does not consider taxes and subsidies.
The second strand of literature related to our paper deals with commitment problems
and redistribution in the context of labor income taxation and human capital formation.5
Andersson and Konrad (2000) compare a closed economy with a two-country world where
migration costs of skilled workers are zero. In their analysis, globalization tends to increase
welfare and might even lead to an eﬃcient solution, since perfect mobility curbs excessive
taxation of high incomes and thus softens the hold-up problem. This conclusion is qualiﬁed
in Andersson and Konrad (2003). Tax competition of two Leviathan governments reduces
the hold-up problem, but governments and the individuals might be worse oﬀ in the open
economy because governments attempt to prevent education in the former case. Our paper
also shows possible problems of globalization, but it follows a very diﬀerent route. We
stress the role of credit market constraints and administrative costs absent in Andersson
and Konrad (2000, 2003), and characterize individual welfare as a continuous and non-
monotonic function of migration costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the
basic framework and some preliminary results. Section 3 characterizes the optimal tax
and education policy of a redistributive government. In section 4 we analyze how the
incomes of skilled and unskilled workers are aﬀected by declining migration costs. The
role of international wage diﬀerentials and administrative costs are explored as well. The
ﬁnal section concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
5The lack of commitment is also analyzed in other contexts. Boadway and Keen (1998) and Kehoe
(1989) among others consider this problem in the case of capital income taxation.
62 The Model
In this section we develop a simple model of human capital accumulation, international
migration, and government intervention. Particular attention is given to the size of mi-
gration costs, which are meant to capture the degree of globalization. Our approach
incorporates four fundamental features, namely limited individual access to credit mar-
kets, administrative costs of collecting taxes, the government’s inability to commit to
future policies, and the threat of brain drain.
More speciﬁcally, a continuum of individuals lives in a small open economy and must
make sequential decisions on education and migration. Individuals diﬀer in their ex-
ogenous endowment and may be credit constrained when the need to ﬁnance education
arises. The government intervenes by subsidizing education and, after education deci-
sions are made, by taxing skilled workers and granting transfers to unskilled workers.
The sequence of decisions therefore is (1) government implements education subsidy, (2)
households decide on education, (3) government chooses tax and transfer levels, (4) skilled
people decide on migration, and (5) all individuals supply inelastically one unit of labor
and consume their income and their wealth.6 The ordering of stages (2) and (3) generates
a potential hold-up problem, which the government can mitigate by providing education
subsidies in the ﬁrst stage.
For the reasons mentioned in the introduction, we assume that the government pur-
sues a redistributive objective by maximizing the net labor income of an unskilled worker
(which is equivalent to maximizing the transfer to an unskilled worker). This objective
function allows us to deal in a simple way with a centerpiece of the dispute over global-
ization, namely the relationship between globalization, redistribution and human capital
accumulation.
2.1 Households
Individuals maximize the amount available for consumption z, which depends on gross
wages, taxes, transfers, education subsidies, school costs, migration costs, and initial
wealth. We explain each of these factors in turn.
In stage 2 individuals decide whether to attend school to become a skilled worker in
stage 5. Without education a person is an unskilled worker in stage 5 with wage wL.
6The increasing responsiveness of the migration choices of the high skilled to tax diﬀerentials is stressed,
for instance, in Edwards and de Rugy (2002). Like Andersson and Konrad (2003, 2002), we take up this
point by assuming that individuals decide on migration after the government set taxes and transfers.
7Her skilled counterpart earns wage wH when not migrating, and receives wage w (net of
foreign taxes) in case of emigration gross of migration costs m. We assume w ≥ wH >w L,
which reﬂects diﬀerential wages across countries and sets the stage for ‘brain drain’ to
occur. We allow only skilled workers to emigrate. The possibility of low-skilled migration
is brieﬂy discussed in section 5.
Exogenous wealth y, which is portable in case of migration, is uniformly distributed
on the support [0,1].R e ﬂecting the presence of credit market constraints, we assume that
an individual can invest in education only if her endowment y plus government subsidy s
exceeds the costs of education c,t h a ti s ,
y ≥ c − s. (1)
We assume 1 >c>0, so that in the absence of government intervention some but not all
individuals are credit constrained.
In stage 5 an individual who does not emigrate is subject to tax T if she is skilled and
receives transfer b if she is unskilled. Thus an individual’s consumption z is




w − m + s − c if worker invests in skills and emigrates
wH − T + s − c if worker invests in skills and stays home
wL + b if worker remains unskilled.
(2)
2.2 Government
The government has three instruments, namely the tax on income of skilled workers T,
the transfer to unskilled workers b, and a uniform education subsidy s.7 We assume that
the education subsidy must be nonnegative. Collecting taxes on labor income is costly for
the government. Apart from the basic administrative work involved in handling tax ﬁles,
additional costs arise since people may try to hide their true income or bribe tax clerks. A
household’s attempt to evade or avoid payments are the more attractive, the higher taxes
are. Consequently, the tax administration’s expenses to discourage fraud and corruption
increase in the assessed individual tax payment.8 This feature is incorporated in our
model by distinguishing between the tax T, which is the amount paid by the household,
and the ‘net’ tax t, which remains for the government after the administrative costs of
enforcing the tax T are deducted:9
t = f (T).( 3 )
7The uniformity assumption is discussed below.
8Alternatively, we could assume that labor supply is endogenous and taxation creates a deadweight
loss. The marginal loss is increasing in the tax rate.
9A similar notion is applied in Perotti (1993) and Bearse, Glomm and Janeba (2000).
8The function f(T) is assumed to fulﬁll the following properties for T ≥ 0:
(i) f(0) = 0 (ii) ∂f(0)/∂T =1 ( iii) ∂
2f/∂T
2 < 0( iv) ∃T : ∂f/∂T =0 .
Property (i) is straightforward. According to property (ii), administrative costs are
negligible for very small taxes. Moreover, properties (i), (ii) and (iii) together imply that
f(T) <Tfor all T>0. The strict concavity of net tax t in individual payment T
expressed by (iii) is equivalent to strictly convex administrative costs in T. Finally, (iv)
restricts the maximum net tax, denoted by   t, w h i c ht h eg o v e r n m e n tc a no b t a i nf r o ma
household. The corresponding tax payment by households is   T = f−1(  t). The properties
( i )t o( i v )t o g e t h e ri m p l yaL a ﬀer-type revenue function.
We assume that administrative costs occur only if the government enforces payments
from households, but not when making transfers to households. Education subsidies and
transfers to unskilled workers do not involve any enforcement expenses. Introducing such
costs would reinforce their importance, but would also make the model less tractable
without providing additional insights.
We can now state the government’s budget constraint
sE + b(1 − E)=tH,( 4 )
where E and H denote the total number of skilled individuals and the number of skilled
workers not migrating, respectively. Expenditures for subsidies sE and transfers to un-
skilled workers have to be covered by the net tax payments from non-migrating skilled
workers.
We solve for the time-consistent outcome, and characterize the equilibrium as a func-
tion of the migration costs parameter, the international wage diﬀerential for skilled work-
ers, and the degree of government ineﬃciency in collecting taxes. When the government
chooses tax T and transfer b in the third stage, it implements the policy which is opti-
mal at that point in time, given the decisions in the previous stages. In stages 1 and 3
the government takes the subsequent responses of all individuals into account. Likewise,
forward-looking individuals anticipate future optimal policies and act accordingly.
2.3 Some Preliminary Results
Before we solve explicitly for the equilibrium, we can already derive some preliminary
insights that hold throughout. The outcome of the migration decision in the fourth stage
is straightforward. A skilled worker compares her consumption level in her home region
with her outside option. Since all other decisions are already made, only net wages and
9migration costs are important at that point in time. She stays in her country of birth if
and only if the migration constraint
wH − T ≥ w − m (5)
is fulﬁlled. This condition requires that the mobility costs m are higher than the interna-
tional net income diﬀerential. Because wealth is assumed to be portable, condition (5) is
independent of y and thus
H =
 
E if T ≤ wH + m − w
0 if T>w H + m − w.
(6)
Migration is an all-or-nothing decision. While this feature is unrealistic, it is suﬃcient for
our purposes, namely to examine how government policy and human capital accumulation
are aﬀected by the threat of brain drain.
The second insight comes from establishing a condition for investment in education
to take place. Individuals want to attend school if and only if it leads to a (non-strictly)
higher consumption level, that is, if and only if the incentive constraint
max{w − m,wH − T} + s − c ≥ wL + b (7)
holds, where the left side of (7) is net income of a skilled worker, and the right side
represents net income of an unskilled individual. Each individual faces the same incentive
constraint, so that either all households want to invest in human capital or none.10 Even if
(7) holds, only those whose initial wealth exceeds c−s can overcome the credit constraint
(1) and can become a skilled person. Since the number of households for whom the credit
constraint is not binding is E =
  1
c−s dy =1− (c − s), the aggregate outcome of the
education decision in the second stage is given by
E =
 
0 if (7) is not fulﬁlled
1 − (c − s) if (7) is fulﬁlled.
(8)
The next insight follows from imposing reasonable restrictions on education costs
relative to administrative costs and gross wages. In particular, we consider only the
plausible case in which the government is not able to ﬁnance higher education for every
10The incentive constraint of wealthy individuals and thus the potential hold-up problem might be
softened if the government used ‘wealth-tested’ subsidies and transfers as instruments. But even then,
the incentive constraint would still exist, as long as the government revenue is constrained. A downside
of conditioning education subsidies on wealth is that they increase administrative and compliance costs,
as pointed out by the World Bank (1999, p. 52f).
10individual. In addition, we assume that gross income gains of education exceed the costs
of education. Formally, we have
Assumption 1 a)   t<c b) wH − wL − c>  T −  t.
Part a) implies that not all individuals can become skilled since the maximum net
tax - and hence the maximum education subsidy - falls short of schooling costs. The
individuals with the lowest initial wealth (y =0 )e n du pa su n s k i l l e dw o r k e r s . P a r tb )
means that education is socially desirable in the absence of credit constraints because
  T −  t>0 and therefore the skilled wage exceeds the unskilled wage plus schooling costs.
Moreover, the social beneﬁt from education exceeds the administrative costs per taxpayer
at the maximum net tax. Without this feature no individual would become skilled, as
will be argued in section 4.
Assumption 1 has another important implication. For all policies (s,b,T) which fulﬁll
incentive constraint (7) and budget constraint (4), the domestic net wage of the skilled
workers, wH − T, is strictly higher than the net wage of an unskilled worker, wL + b.I n
other words, the government is unable to equalize net wages by means of transfers to
the unskilled even if educated people do not avoid domestic taxation through emigration.
The reason is easy to see. If net labor income of the skilled and unskilled workers were
identical, no individual would have an incentive to invest parts of her initial wealth in
education. People would only become skilled if the school costs were completely funded
by the government. Such a subsidy, however, is not feasible by assumption.
With our second assumption we restrict the parameter range for the migration costs
as follows:
Assumption 2 m ∈
 
w − wH,w − wH +   T
 
.
Migration constraint (5) shows that for all m in the interior of the interval [w−wH,w−
wH +   T] the government can set a strictly positive tax without driving skilled workers out
of the country, but the tax falls short of the maximum tax   T. Only at the upper end of
the interval, that is m = w − wH +   T,the possibility of brain drain does not restrict tax
policy at all, and   T can be implemented. Essentially the latter case mimics the case of
closed borders. At the other extreme of the parameter range, where m = w − wH,a n y
taxation of labor income of skilled workers is incompatible with no migration. Thus the
lower end of the interval stands for ‘total’ openness. Considering values of m outside the
interval does not add any further insights.
113 Redistribution and Education
In this section we characterize the optimal policy of a redistributive government and pay
particular attention to its relationship to the migration costs. The government maximizes
net labor income of an unskilled worker, V = wL + b, which after using the government
budget constraint (4), can be rewritten as




Maximizing welfare V is identical to maximizing the transfer to an unskilled household b.
The endogenous variables s, b, t, T, E and H are solved for by means of backward induc-
tion. Note that stage 5 is trivial because individuals supply one unit of labor inelastically
and consume all income and wealth.
3.1 The Threat of Brain Drain and Tax Policy
Taking the migration behavior (5) into account, the government chooses tax T to maxi-
mize (9) in the third stage. At that point the number of skilled people E and the subsidy
s are given as results of past decisions. Government revenue tH is the only remaining en-
dogenous variable in the objective function (9) since the other variables jointly determine
total education expenses sE and the number of transfer recipients (1 − E).T h et r a n s f e r
to an unskilled worker increases in tH.
The government faces two limits when maximizing these revenues. First, adminis-
trative costs restrict the ‘net’ tax t to be at most   t. Second, the threat of brain drain
constrains the maximum payment from educated workers to be equal to wH + m − w,
which is the tax equalizing net income at home and abroad. The size of the migration
costs determines which of these upper bounds is binding. If the ‘price’ of international
mobility m equals the diﬀerence between foreign net wage w and domestic gross wage wH
(i.e., m = w−wH), no tax can be enforced from skilled workers and T =0is optimal. For
migration costs m ∈
 
w − wH,w − wH +   T
 
, strictly positive payments in the amount of
wH +m−w from skilled workers can be collected, but the government is still constrained
by the threat of migration. Only for very high costs, m = w − wH +   T, the government
is able to collect   T without driving skilled workers out of the country. We illustrate the
t a xp o l i c yi nﬁgure 1 and summarize it in
Proposition 1 Optimal Tax Policy.
The optimal tax on skilled workers in stage 3 is given by
T
∗(m)=wH + m − w,w h e r eT
∗(w − wH)=0 and T
∗(w − wH +   T)=  T. (10)
12m1 m2 T w w H
~ + −




Figure 1: Optimal Tax and Subsidy
The optimal tax linearly increases in the parameter m, that is ∂T∗/∂m =1 , a property
we will use later. Since the government implements the maximum tax consistent with no
migration, we can rewrite (6), the number of skilled workers staying in their home country,
and obtain
H = E.( 1 1 )
Although migration does not occur in equilibrium, the threat of brain drain in itself shapes
the tax policy in the third stage.
3.2 Education Decision and Subsidy
We now turn to the analysis of the education subsidy and the households’ education deci-
sion itself. When the government chooses the subsidy level, it anticipates the behavioral
responses in all subsequent stages, in particular the induced investment in skills and fu-
ture tax policy. Similarly, a household’s education choice is not only based on the public
subsidy, but each person also takes expected taxes and transfers into account. Individual
decisions result from the credit constraint (1), the migration constraint (5), and the incen-
tive constraint (7). The interaction of these constraints gives rise to three distinct cases,
depending on the size of the migration costs, where the intervals [w − wH,m 1], (m1,m 2]
13and
 
m2,w − wH +   T
 
represent low, intermediate and high migration costs, respectively.
The optimal subsidy in these intervals and the number of skilled workers are stated in
Proposition 2 and illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
Proposition 2 Optimal Education Decision and Subsidy.






0 if m ∈ [w − wH,m 1]
so = c −
√
c − t∗ > 0 if m ∈ (m1,m 2]
smin = t∗−cΩ
1−Ω >s o if m ∈
 




where Ω = wH − wL − c − (T∗ − t∗) and t∗ = f(T∗(m)). The optimal subsidy s∗ is a
continuous function in m. It is constant for low migration costs and strictly increasing in
m for intermediate and high migration costs.
(ii) The number of skilled workers E (m)=1− c + s∗(m) ∈ [1 − c,1) increases in m.
We provide a formal proof in the appendix and discuss in the following the economic
intuition. First, note that from the perspective of a redistributive government education
subsidies are an investment into the national tax base. But this investment pays only if
the ‘return’, i.e., the tax on the labor income of skilled workers, is suﬃciently high. The
education subsidy equals zero in the case of low migration costs (m ≤ m1) and thus a low
tax T∗. The government simply uses all revenues to transfer them to unskilled workers.
The optimal subsidy becomes strictly positive in the case of intermediate migration
costs (m1 <m<m 2). On the one hand, the optimal tax T∗ is now suﬃciently high so
that a strictly positive education subsidy is a beneﬁcial investment for the government.
On the other hand, the tax is still suﬃciently low so that the net income of a skilled worker
exceeds the net income of an unskilled worker. In other words, the incentive constraint is
fulﬁlled, and each individual wants to invest in human capital. In this case, an education
subsidy only serves as a device to overcome the individual credit constraint. The subsidy









2 =0 ,( 1 3 )
w h e r ew em a k eu s eo ft∗ = f(T∗(m)) and E = H =1− (c − s) (cf. (3), (8), (9), (10)
and (11)). A larger education subsidy ties up government resources not available for
redistribution. This direct spending eﬀect is reﬂe c t e di nt h eﬁrst term of (13), which is
negative. In the opposite direction works the second eﬀect, which we term the indirect
14‘social composition eﬀect’. Supporting investment in education reduces the number of
unskilled workers who receive transfers, while at the same time it boosts the number of
skilled workers subject to taxation. The compositional change enables larger transfers if
the education subsidy s falls short of the expected net tax t∗ (see second term of (13)).
Moreover, the ‘social composition eﬀect’ gains weight ceteris paribus if the net tax rises in
response to higher migration costs. A higher future payment t∗ makes it more attractive
to promote schooling, and the optimal subsidy so increases in m.
For low and intermediate levels of m, the migration constraint is binding, but the
incentive constraint is not. The situation changes when the migration costs exceed the
critical value m2,w h i c hi st h ec a s eo fhigh migration costs. Private investment in education
is unproﬁtable unless a ‘suboptimally’ high education subsidy is granted in the ﬁrst stage
because high migration cost lead to heavy tax burdens and a low net wage wH − TH.
Now, the education subsidy does not aim at ‘optimally’ overcoming the credit constraint,
but its purpose is to ensure that individuals want to attend school. The government sets
s such that the incentive constraint (7) is just fulﬁlled. The implemented subsidy smin,
which is the minimum subsidy necessary for the incentive constraint to hold, is above the
level so. It serves as a second-best tool to compensate for the government’s inability to
commit to a lower tax in stage 3. The subsidy is larger, the higher the tax on skilled
workers. Consequently, the necessary support smin is positively related to the mobility
costs.
Since the subsidy (weakly) increases in the migration costs over the whole domain of
m, the number of people who can aﬀord to attend school and become skilled also goes
up. But the optimal subsidy is never suﬃcient to cover total school costs so that some
individuals always remain unskilled, i.e., E<1 holds.
4T h e W e l f a r e E ﬀects of Globalization and Govern-
ment Eﬃciency
We are now in a position to analyze the impact of globalization, i.e., a decrease in migra-
tion costs, on the incomes and consumption of skilled and unskilled workers. The next
section shows that unskilled workers can gain and skilled workers can lose from globaliza-
tion. Moreover, there exists a common level of migration costs which is locally ‘optimal’
for both income groups. Section 4.2 further explores how this ‘optimal’ openness and the
net incomes depend on government eﬃciency and the wage abroad.
154.1 Redistribution and Migration Costs
The equilibrium policy yields an inverse u-shaped relationship between the net income
of unskilled workers on the one hand and migration costs on the other hand. Moreover,
the relation between the net wage of skilled workers minus private education costs and
mobility costs are 9-shaped. We explain these results step by step, and illustrate them in
ﬁgure 2 (for convenience, the net incomes adjusted for private education spending minus
the constant wL are drawn in ﬁgure 2).
m1 m2 mopt H w w− T w w H
~ + −
b*
(wH -w L) -T * + s* -c
Figure 2: Net Incomes
The optimistic view of globalization ﬁnds support in our model when migration costs
fall from a very high initial level. In the case of a closed or almost closed economy,
taxes on skilled labor income are very high. As a result of the lack of commitment,
the government has to implement a suboptimally high education subsidy as second-best
policy to compensate for the future tax burden. Such a policy, however, carries real costs
because collecting revenues pushes up administrative expenses. In this situation, enhanced
mobility of human capital ‘commits’ the government to lower taxes. Yet the induced loss
of revenues is outweighed by the drop in bureaucratic costs and education expenditures
so that every unskilled worker can receive a higher transfer. Moreover, skilled workers are
better oﬀ too, since the subsidy decreases by less than the tax payments. Therefore lower
16migration costs implies a Pareto-improvement for m ∈
 
mopt,w − wH +   T
 
,w h e r emopt
is deﬁned as the value of m that maximizes b(s∗(m),T∗(m)). To be precise, an educated
worker gains exactly the same amount as an unskilled worker because in the presence of
a binding incentive constraint each individual receives the same net income adjusted for
private investments in human capital, i.e., wH − T∗ + s∗ − c = wL + b∗ holds.
Our optimistic result turns into the opposite, however, once migration costs fall below
the critical point mopt at which the common net income peaks. While a further drop in
the mobility costs continues to soften the government’s commitment problem, the induced
decline in administrative costs is not signiﬁcant enough to compensate for the loss in
revenues. The government has to reduce transfers. To limit the cuts in the consumption
of unskilled households, resources are shifted from education to transfer spending. As
a consequence, the education subsidy decreases more sharply than the tax payments of
skilled workers, which makes them worse-oﬀ as well. Additionally, the reduced subsidy
lowers the number of skilled workers.
While yet a further reduction in migration costs reduces the transfer to the unskilled,
the consumption of the educated workers eventually increases. At low levels of m,d e c l i n -
ing migration costs narrow the gap between the tax and the education subsidy. Finally,
the net burden T∗−s∗ equals zero at m = w−wH, where the net income of skilled work-
ers adjusted for private education expenses reaches its ‘global’ maximum (see ﬁgure 2).
‘Total’ openness promotes the consumption of those individuals who can aﬀord education
without public support, but it does so at the expense of the unskilled population whose
number grows. Our conclusions are summarized in
Proposition 3 Net Incomes.
(i) If m ∈ [w − wH,m 2),t r a n s f e rb∗ and thus net income of unskilled workers wL+b∗(m)
increase in migration costs m. By contrast, the net income of skilled workers wH−T∗(m)+
s∗(m)−c reaches its global maximum at m = w −wH,w h e r ei te q u a l swH −c. It falls in
m for low migration costs, but it is strictly larger than the net income of the unskilled if
m ∈ [w − wH,m 2).
(ii) If m ∈
 
m2,w − wH +   T
 
, net incomes of unskilled and skilled workers coincide
(wL + b∗ = wH − T∗ + s∗ − c). They ﬁrst rise and then decline in migration costs m.
Proof. See Appendix.
We mentioned earlier the role of assumption 1 b) for our results, which says that for
all possible levels of T, administrative costs of raising taxes are not too high relative to
the social beneﬁts of investing in skills. If the assumption were violated, the outlook
would be much bleaker for suﬃciently high migration costs. In this case, the incentive
17constraint can only be fulﬁlled if the subsidy exceeds the net tax levied on the income
of the skilled workers. This rules out any positive transfers to unskilled workers and
therefore a redistributive government is not willing to support human capital formation.
Individuals do not invest in education, anticipating high future taxes. In such a world
redistribution is no longer feasible and the country ends up without skilled workers.
4.2 Wage Diﬀerentials and Government Ineﬃciency
Having analyzed the impact of declining migration costs on net incomes, we now explore
how the ‘optimal’ openness and the consumption of skilled and unskilled workers are
shaped by two exogenous parameters of the model: the foreign wage w and the degree of
government ineﬃciency in tax collection. Consider ﬁrst the implications of more attractive
foreign earnings for skilled workers. A ni n c r e a s ei nt h ef o r e i g nn e tw a g ew lowers the
optimal tax T∗ by the same amount in order to prevent emigration (see Proposition 1).
Graphically, the tax curve in ﬁgure 1 shifts to the right. The lines representing the subsidy,
the transfer, and the net incomes in ﬁgures 1 and 2 also make a parallel shift to the right
as they all depend on the tax. Consequently, all critical values like m2 and mopt move to
the right.
The decline in tax T∗ causes a fall in subsidies and thus in the number of skilled
workers. In case of a marginal rise in w, the transfer to the unskilled workers increases
(decreases) if migration costs are above (below) the initially optimal level mopt.T h i s
simply reﬂects the fact that a higher foreign net wage reinforces the eﬀects of openness
on transfers, which are positive for m>m opt, b u tn e g a t i v ef o rm<m opt.T h es h i f ti nw,
moreover, increases the ‘optimal’ migration costs. Thus the larger the international wage
gap w − wH is, the less a redistributive government is in favor of openness. Note that
even skilled workers might lose. For migration costs m between the ‘new’ level m2 and the
‘old’ level mopt, consumption of skilled workers decreases like consumption of unskilled
workers. We summarize these insights in
Proposition 4 Transfers and Outside Option.
When the foreign net wage w rises marginally, the transfer to an unskilled worker increases
(decreases) if the migration costs m are above (below) the originally optimal level mopt.
The transfer-maximizing migration costs mopt rise.
Proof. See Appendix.
We are also interested in studying the comparative statics eﬀects of exogenous changes
in government eﬃciency. To this end, we specify the net tax function to be
18t = αf (T).( 1 4 )
By modifying the parameter α, αmin < α ≤ 1, changes in the eﬃciency of the tax
bureaucracy is captured. A lower α means higher administrative costs of collecting tax
T. The size of α does not aﬀect the optimal tax policy in the third stage, which is only
driven by the migration costs and the outside option for skilled workers. The parameter α
determines the net tax t∗ h o w e v e r .T h em o r ee ﬃcient the government collects taxes, the
more resources are available for redistribution. Consequently, the transfer to an unskilled
worker increases in α for all levels of migration costs. Furthermore, the optimal education
subsidy so also increases in α, since a larger eﬃciency parameter yields a higher net tax
and therefore makes public subsidies toward human capital accumulation more attractive.
As the transfer to an unskilled workers rises, the minimum subsidy smin, which guarantees
that the incentive constraint is fulﬁlled, goes up by the same amount. In line with the
education subsidy, the number of skilled workers increase in α for both intermediate and
high migration costs. Since subsidies and transfers rise, skilled and unskilled workers
are better-oﬀ.( S e e ﬁgure 3, which shows the curves of ﬁgure 2 for high (dotted line)
intermediate (bold line) and low (broken line) levels of α.)
Proposition 5 Transfers, Human Capital, and Government Eﬃciency.
For all migration costs m, the transfer to an unskilled worker is larger, the higher the
eﬃciency parameter α. The optimal education subsidies so and smin increase in α, leading
to more skilled workers for intermediate and high migration costs, and improving the
consumption of all workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
Interestingly, there can be a non-monotonic relationship between α and the optimal
openness mopt.11 Countries with suﬃciently small and large values of α prefer rather
small migration costs, while governments with intermediate administrative costs beneﬁt
from higher mobility costs (see again ﬁgure 3). To understand this claim, we relate the
magnitudes of the potential globalization beneﬁts to the administrative eﬃciency. Recall
that a government with a redistributive objective can gain from lower mobility costs for
two related reasons: First, globalization reduces administrative costs, and, second, it
curbs suboptimally high education spendings. In combination, the beneﬁts can outweigh
a country’s loss of revenues due to enhanced mobility. The ﬁrst argument is particularly
11We do not prove this claim here formally, but discuss it intuitively. A formal proof is available upon
request from the authors.
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Figure 3: Transfers and Government Eﬃciency
important for a very ineﬃcient government which suﬀers from high administrative costs.
That is why the optimal migration costs mopt can be rather low in this case.
To see why an eﬃcient government can prefer low migration costs is less straight-
forward. Note, however, that a high value of α requires a particularly large education
subsidy to overcome the hold-up problem (as argued above, smin increases in α). Thus a
rise in administrative eﬃciency further drives up the number of students which is already
suboptimally large. Since globalization in the form of falling m curbs the high education
spending and hence leaves more resources for transfers, an eﬃcient government may favor
rather small migration costs.
By contrast, in case of intermediate levels of α,t h eg o v e r n m e n tm i g h tb em o r es k e p t i c a l
toward globalization. It this situation the government prefers larger migration costs than
the eﬃcient and very ineﬃcient type, since the additional revenues are not completely
exhausted by higher education spending (due to the limited number of the students) and
administrative expenses (due to a suﬃciently eﬃcient bureaucracy). Thus, less openness
yields a higher transfer to an unskilled worker.
205 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored how declining mobility costs aﬀe c tt h ei n c o m eo fs k i l l e d
and unskilled workers when the government pursues a redistributive policy. Incentive
and credit constraints in combination with administrative costs yield an inverse u-shaped
relationship between transfers to the unskilled workers and openness. For suﬃciently
high migration costs, the recipients of transfers beneﬁt from increasing mobility of human
capital. But the positive eﬀect of globalization is reversed once migration costs fall below
a critical value. From the perspective of unskilled workers this threshold value constitutes
the country’s optimal openness. Moreover, starting from this point skilled workers too do
not beneﬁt from marginally lower migration costs, and the ‘optimal’ openness of the two
income groups ‘locally’ coincides. Even the skilled workers who do not depend on public
support for education are only better-oﬀ in case of a drastic further rise in mobility, since
their net incomes recover for suﬃciently low migration costs. But such low levels might
be out of reach in the near future. Thus, an interesting implication of our analysis is that
wealthy and less wealthy individuals may agree on the optimal degree of international
mobility. To the extent that migration costs are inﬂuenced by governments, there need
not be a conﬂict of interest between the income groups about migration policy.
Our analysis sheds light on the determinants or ‘optimal’ openness. First, the more
attractive the outside option for skilled workers is, the higher the preferred migration
costs from the perspective of a redistributive government. Second, both very eﬃcient
and very ineﬃcient governments might prefer rather low migration costs compared to an
administration with an intermediate level of α. This conclusion is in contrast to the line
of reasoning that argues that internal reforms, like implementing a more eﬃcient bureau-
cracy, are necessary before a country can take advantage of globalization. According to
this view, a country should embrace free trade the more, the more eﬃcient its adminis-
tration works. We challenge this conclusion by showing that, depending in particular on
the initial starting position, the ‘optimal’ openness might increase as well as decline if the
tax administration becomes marginally more eﬃcient.
The issue of international migration is likely to gain importance in the future. Facing
aging societies and shortages of skilled workers in some professions, many industrialized
countries have implemented or at least discussed reforms of their immigration laws. Even
Germany, a country which traditionally provides only very limited opportunities for for-
eigners to stay permanently, has started to oﬀer its version of a green card to foreign
computer experts. More importantly perhaps, the eastern enlargement of the European
Union enables skilled workers to search for jobs in the richer parts of the continent. In
21terms of our model, this is equivalent to decreasing migration costs. Our analysis suggests
that the welfare eﬀects (from the perspective of the source countries) depend on the level
of openness initially. For instance, restricting labor mobility between the old and the new
EU member states for a transition period might well be in the interest of the relatively
poor East European regions.
We conclude by pointing to two possible extensions of our formal analysis. First, by
assuming exogenous wages we ignore any positive externalities from human capital. Our
model therefore tends to underestimate the negative impact of brain drain. Second, we
do not consider emigration of unskilled workers, although in practice less skilled workers
participate in international labor migration to some degree. From the perspective of a
redistributive government emigration of unskilled workers is beneﬁcial because it reduces
the number of transfer recipients. The absence of unskilled migration leads us to over-
estimate the consequences of brain drain. Both extensions should be examined in more
detail in future work.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :(i) Reformulating objective function (9) yields
V =
 
wL if (7) is not fulﬁlled
wL +
(t∗−s)E
1−E if (7) is fulﬁlled,
(A1)
where, based on (10) and (11), the expected net tax t∗ = f(T∗(m)) and the number of
skilled workers who stay home H = E are taken into account.
Note that at m = w − wH,w eh a v eb = s = T∗ = wH + m − w =0 , and hence the
incentive constraint (7) is not binding by Assumption 1. For slightly higher migration
cost, the government can tax skilled workers without violating (7). There remains the






(c − s)2.( A 2 )
We now evaluate (A2) at s =0(noticing that ∂2V/∂s2 =2 ( t∗ − c)/(c − s)3 < 0 by
Assumption 1) and obtain
dV
ds




c2 ( 0 ⇔ t
∗ ( c(1 − c).( A 3 )
A subsidy s>0 aﬀects transfer b positively only if the net tax t∗ is larger than c(1 − c).
Recall t∗ = f(T∗(m)) depends positively on m. Thus there exists a migration cost level
22m1, for which t∗ = c(1 − c), such that for all m ≤ m1 the optimal subsidy is zero, but is
positive for m>m 1.
Once the migration costs exceed m1, the optimal policy is given by the solution to the
ﬁrst-order condition ∂V/∂s =0 ,n a m e l y 12
s
o = c − (c − t
∗)
1/2 .( A 4 )
In this case, the subsidy increases in the enforceable net tax t∗, t∗ <c(by Assumption
1), and thus in mobility costs m, which follows directly from (A4).
Increasing migration costs narrow the consumption gap between skilled and unskilled
households. Eventually the incentive constraint becomes binding. Substituting the budget
constraint (4) and the optimal subsidy (A4) into the incentive constraint (7) gives
wH − wL − c − (T
∗ − t
∗) − 1+( c − t
∗)
1/2 ≥ 0.( A 5 )
The left side declines in m, since the administrative costs T∗ − t∗ rise and the term
(c − t∗)
1/2 falls in m. Consequently, there exists a critical value m2 such that the solution
so is not compatible with the incentive constraint for all m>m 2. The education subsidy
s h a st or i s ea b o v et h el e v e lso in order to overcome the commitment problem.13 Thus
the incentive constraint dictates a subsidy smin for m ≥ m2. Inserting budget constraint
(4) into (7) yields
(c − s)Ω ≥ t
∗ − s,w h e r eΩ = wH − wL − c − (T
∗ − t
∗).( A 6 )
B yA s s u m p t i o n1t h i si n e q u a l i t yi sa l w a y sf u l ﬁlled when Ω ≥ 1. Hence, if the incentive





,( A 7 )
where smin <t ∗ holds. Thus so and smin are the optimal subsidies in their respective
intervals. The subsidy smin increases in tax T and therefore also in migration costs.









(1 − Ω)∂t∗/∂T∗ +( 1− ∂t∗/∂T∗)(c − t∗)
(1 − Ω)
2 > 0,( A 8 )
12There exists a second root to the quadratic equation in s, but at this value the second-order condition
is violated and s>cwould hold, which is ruled out by Assumption 1.
13The increased spending ensures human capital accumulation in two ways. First, it directly enhances
beneﬁts from education reﬂected in an increase of the right side of incentive constraint (7). Second, an
‘ineﬃcient’ high level s>s o curbs transfer b and therefore the left side of (7).
14We implicitly assume that there exist subintervals of m which imply so > 0 and smin > 0 respectively.
See our comments on this issue at the end of the proof.
23since Ω < 1 (as outlined above), c>t ∗ (by Assumption 1) and ∂t∗/∂T∗ < 1 (see properties
of (3)).
The optimal subsidy s∗(m) i sac o n t i n u o u sf u n c t i o n ,s i n c ei ti sc o n t i n u o u sw i t h i ne a c h
of the subintervals [w − wH,m 1], [m1,m 2] and
 
m2,w − wH +   T
 
, and because so(m1)=
0 and so(m2)=smin(m2) hold. We implicitly assume here m1 <m 2 < w − wH +   T.
Equation (A3), however, does not rule out the possibility that even for m = m1, and
the resulting net tax t∗ = c(1 − c), the incentive constraint is not fulﬁlled. Since the
critical value m2 may well lie below m1,t h ei n t e r v a l[m1,m 2) can vanish. On the other
hand, (A3) might hold for m = w − wH +   T, implying the net tax t∗ =   t. In this case
the incentive constraint never prevents the government from imposing the ‘unrestricted’
optimal subsidy so. In general, the lower the gross beneﬁts from education (wH −wL −c)
and the higher the administrative costs (T∗ − t∗) are, the more elastic is the household
response to government intervention and the lower is the threshold value m2.
(ii) This conclusion directly follows from (8), (12) and the relation s<c(see Assump-
tion 1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :(i) Inserting the optimal solution s∗ into the second line of
(A1) yields V = wL + t∗(1 − c)/c for m ∈ [w − wH,m 1] and V = wL +[ 1− (c − t∗)1/2]2
for m ∈ (m1,m 2]. Both terms increase in t∗ and thus in m.
If m ∈ [w − wH,m 1], the adjusted net income of skilled workers IH(m) ≡ wH − T∗ +
s∗ − c amounts to w − m − c and therefore decreases in m.M o r e o v e r , IH(w − wH)=
wH −c>w H −T∗ +s∗ −c = IH(m) for m ∈
 
w − wH,w − wH +   T
 
,s i n c es∗ <t ∗ <T ∗
follows from (12) and Assumption 1.
(ii) In the interval
 
m2,w − wH +   T
 
, the incentive constraint is binding, i.e. wH −
T∗ + s∗ − c = wL + b∗ holds. We need to analyze only the impact of changes in m on
transfer b∗ to see the eﬀect of migration costs on the adjusted net incomes of both skilled

















      
indirect eﬀect
.( A 9 )
The direct impact is strictly positive as long as higher migration costs can be indeed
transformed into a higher net tax (∂V/∂t∗ = E/(1−E) > 0 and, if t∗ <   t, ∂t∗/∂T∗ > 0).
For t∗ =   t, the derivative ∂t∗/∂T∗ becomes zero, and the direct impact disappears. The
indirect eﬀect is negative for s>s o,s i n c edV (smin)/ds < 0 and dsmin/dT ∗ > 0 (see
(A8)). It vanishes at m = m2, where the minimum subsidy smin coincides with the
optimal ‘unrestricted’ solution so, since the marginal impact of the subsidy on welfare
24equals zero at this point (for s = so,t h eﬁrst-order condition obviously holds and the
envelope theorem can be applied). Thus, the transfer increases in migration costs at
m = m2, where only the strictly positive, direct impact appears. On the other hand, it
declines in m at w − wH +   T (where t∗ =   t and only the negative impact is left).


















.( A 1 0 )
The term in the second line is negative, since ∂t∗/∂T∗ < 1, 0 < Ω < 1 and c>t ∗ follow
from the properties of (3), a binding incentive constraint, and assumption 1. Moreover,
the expression in the ﬁr s tl i n ei sn e g a t i v et o o ,b e c a u s e∂2t∗/∂(T∗)2 < 0, 0 < Ω < 1 and
1 ≥ (c − t∗)/(1 − Ω)2. The latter inequality can be derived by inserting (A7) into (A2):
dV/ds =1−(1 − Ω)
2 /(c − t∗).S i n c edV/ds ≤ 0 for smin ≥ so, 1−(1 − Ω)
2 /(c − t∗) ≤ 0
and thus (c − t∗)/(1 − Ω)2 ≤ 1 if m ≥ m2.
Taken together, the above features, namely dV/dm|m=m2 > 0, dV/dm|m=w−wH+  T < 0
and d2V/dm2 < 0, lead to an inverse u-shaped relationship between the endogenous
variable b and the exogenous parameter m in the interval
 
m2,w − wH +   T
 
.
Proof of Proposition 4: Foreign net wage w only aﬀects transfer b through the im-
pact on T∗ (see (10)). Thus, dV/dw =( dV/dT∗)(dT/dw)=−(dV/dT∗), which implies








dV 2/d(T∗)2 =1 .( A 1 1 )
Proof of Proposition 5: For low and intermediate migration costs, the marginal eﬀect
of α on transfers amounts to dV/dα = f(1−c)/c > 0 and dV/dα = f[1−c+s∗]/[c−s∗] >
0, respectively, where (13), (14), and (A1, second line) are taken into account. (Note
that ds/dα =0and dV/ds|s=s∗ =0hold for low and intermediate migration costs,
respectively.)
For high migration costs, the corresponding term follows from (14) and V = wL +












f.( A 1 2 )
15Inserting (A7) into (A1, second line) yields V = wL + Ω[1 − (c − t∗)/(1 − Ω)].T h i s e x p r e s s i o n
implies dV/dT∗ = −(1 − ∂t∗/∂T∗)
 
1 − (c − t∗)/(1 − Ω)
2
 
+( ∂t∗/∂T∗)Ω/(1 − Ω), which is equivalent
to (A9) and enables to calculate (A10) rather conveniently.
25This expression is strictly positive, since (c−t∗)/(1−Ω)2 ≤ 1 and 1/(1−Ω) > 1 hold for
smin ≥ so (see remarks after (A10)). Thus dV/dα > 0 results over the whole domain of
m.16
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